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compulsion, mental capacity, diminished responsibility 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the ability of mental incapacity tests to account for 
problems of control, through a study of the approach to alcohol dependency and 
a comparison with the approach to anorexia nervosa, in England and Wales. The 
focus is on two areas of law where questions of legal and mental capacity arise 
for people who are alcohol dependent: decisions about treatment for alcohol 
dependency and diminished responsibility for a killing. The mental incapacity tests 
used in these legal contexts are importantly different—one involves a ‘cognitive’ 
test, while the other includes an explicit impaired-control limb—and the 
comparison provides insight into a longstanding debate about the virtues of one 
type of test over the other. It is shown that both kinds of test can take control 
problems into account, but also that both can be interpreted in narrow and wide 
ways that significantly influence the outcome of the assessment. It is therefore 
argued that to a large extent, it is not the kind of mental incapacity test that 
matters, but how the test is interpreted. It is further proposed that value 
judgements are playing an unrecognised and inappropriate role in shaping this 
interpretation. This raises concerns about the current approach to assessing the 
impact of alcohol dependency on the capacity to make decisions about alcohol 




1. Setting the scene: Legal capacity and impaired control 
A long-recognised principle holds that mental incapacity can justify restricting a 
person’s legal rights or responsibilities, which together can be described using the 
term ‘legal capacity’.1 The legitimacy of linking legal capacity to mental capacity is 
currently under scrutiny in international human rights law and the conclusions of 
this paper may be relevant to these unfolding debates.2 However, the focus of 
this paper is law as it stands in England and Wales, where mental and legal 
capacity are closely linked. Paradigmatic examples are found in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), which allows that self-determination in one’s personal 
affairs can be limited based on a mental incapacity; and the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility, which mitigates culpability on grounds of mental 
incapacity, reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter. 
 
One issue that arises in both civil and criminal contexts concerns the ability of 
mental incapacity tests to account for control problems, which are often seen as 
central to addiction but also other conditions such as anorexia nervosa and 
compulsive hoarding.3 The literature has framed this issue as a question about 
                                                        
1 S. Blumenthal, 'The default legal person' (2007) 54 UCLA Law Review, 1262; E. Hasson, 'Capacity to 
marry: Law, medicine and conceptions of insantity' (2010) 23 Social History of Medicine 1. 
2 P. Bartlett, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and mental 
health law' (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 752; A. Ward, A.R. Keene, A. Hempsey, C. Caughey, J. 
Stavert, R. McGregor, S. Michalowski and W. Martin, 'Three jurisdictions report: Towards compliance 
with CRPD art. 12 in capacity/incapacity legislation across the UK' (The Essex Autonomy Project, 
2016).  
3 In relation to addiction, impaired control in the use of the relevant substance is a defining feature 
within the major classification systems. Research into experts’ views about addiction has also shown 
that a loss of control, in some sense, is how addiction is most commonly defined. However, there is 
considerable disagreement about the extent to which control is impaired in addiction, and how this 
impairment should be understood. This is also evident in the legal analysis within sections 7 and 8 of 
this paper. A. Carter, R. Mathews, S. Bell, J. Lucke and W. Hall, ‘Control and Responsibility in Addicted 
Individuals: What Do Addiction Neuroscientists and Clinicians Think?’ (2014) 7 Neuroethics 205; M. 
 4 
whether so-called ‘cognitive’ or ‘rationality’ tests—which do not contain 
reference to impaired control—are sufficient, or whether such tests should 
contain an explicit impaired-control element. The test within the MCA is an 
example of a cognitive standard, referring only to the person’s ability to 
understand, retain, use and weigh information (and express a decision). In 
contrast, the law of diminished responsibility includes an impaired ability to 
“exercise self-control” as one element within its statutory test.4 
 
In relation to capacity to consent to treatment, Louis Charland has argued that 
cognitive tests often fail to account for control problems.5 Using the example of 
addiction, Charland proposes that while associated impairments of appreciation 
and reasoning may be identified using such tests, compulsion is not 
straightforwardly accounted for. Similarly, with a focus on law in Victoria, 
Australia, Steve Matthews has argued that the mental incapacity required for 
involuntary treatment to be imposed for substance dependency, must be 
volitional rather than cognitive.6  In England and Wales, such concerns are related 
to the criticism that mental capacity law contains a cognitive or intellectual bias. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Karasaki, S. Fraser, D. Moore and P. Dietze, ‘The place of volition in addiction: Differing approaches 
and their implications for policy and service provision’ (2013) 32 Drug and Alcohol Review 195; S. 
Fraser, ‘Articulating addiction in alcohol and other drug policy: A multiverse of habits’ (2016) 31 
International Journal of Drug Policy 6. 
4 MCA s 3(1); Coroners and Justice Act 2009 s 52(1) A (c). 
5 L.C. Charland, 'Decision-making capacity' in E.N. Zalta (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy 
(2014); P.S. Appelbaum, 'Ought we to require emotional capacity as part of decisional competence?' 
(1998) 8 Kennedy Inst Ethics J, 383. 
6 S. Matthews ‘Addiction, Competence and Coercion’ (2014) 39 Journal of Philosophical Research 199. 
In a more recent piece, Matthews qualifies this claim by limiting it to cognitive incapacities in the here 
and now, as they are largely assessed, suggesting that cognitive capacities assessed over time may 
uncover relevant problems. ‘S. Matthews, ‘Addiction and mandatory treatment’ in H. Pickard and S. 
Ahmed (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction (Routledge, 
forthcoming). 
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However, these concerns have so far not focussed on addiction, though they have 
been raised in relation to anorexia nervosa.7 
 
Parallel questions have been more extensively explored in the context of 
incapacity-based criminal defences. The issue in this context is whether cognitive 
tests for excuse or mitigation sufficiently allow problems of control to be taken 
into account. Among others, Michael Louis Corrado has argued that control 
problems should be considered as potential mitigating or excusing factors, and 
that cognitive tests are not sufficient in this regard. Corrado proposes that the 
incapacities relevant to criminal defences come in two distinct kinds. While 
incapacities to grasp one’s reasons can be identified using a cognitive test, 
incapacities to be guided by those reasons cannot.8  
 
Against such views in the criminal context, Stephen Morse has argued that there 
is no persuasive conceptual account of control problems independent of 
cognitive problems. Moreover, he proposes that establishing whether a person 
                                                        
7  J. Tan, T. Hope, A. Stewart and R. Fitzpatrick, 'Control and compulsory treatment in anorexia 
nervosa: The views of patients and parents' (2003) 26 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 627. 
J. Craigie, ‘Competence, practical rationality and What a patient values’ (2011) 25 Bioethics 326. 
For discussion of the ‘intellectual bias’ concern see: N. Banner, 'Unreasonable reasons: Normative 
judgements in the assessment of mental capacity' (2012) 18 Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 
1038, 1040; T. Gergel and G. Owen, 'Fluctuating capacity and advance decision-making in bipolar 
affective disorder:  Self-binding directives and self-determination' (2015) 40 International Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 92, 93 
8 At least not without “redefining defects of reason to include defects of control” M.L. Corrado, 
'Morse on control tests' in P.H. Robinson, S.P. Garvey and K.K. Ferzan (eds) Criminal law conversations 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 461.  
In the same publication see also: S.P. Garvey, 'The folk psychology of self-control' 460; S.D. Rozelle, 
'Sometimes a control test is just a control test' 463; T.A. Maroney, 'Why is a folk-psychological 
account of loss of control necessary (and what precisely is it)?' 465; R.F. Schopp, 'Cognition, 
rationality, and responsibility' 467; and A. Gold, 'Criminal culpability and self-control: Back to 
M'Naughton' (2011) 18 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 525. 
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has a control problem presents practical difficulties that go beyond those 
associated with identifying cognitive problems.9 According to Morse, it is 
theoretically within the scope of cognitive tests to identify the incapacities 
associated with substance dependence, for example, because such conditions can 
undermine the ability to: 
“think straight, to bring reason to bear on the reasons not to act. Some 
people in the throes of intense desires may be virtually unable to think of 
anything except satisfying the desire … Agents in such states will find it 
difficult to behave well because they have severe difficulty contemplating 
alternatives or coherently weighing alternatives. These are rationality 
problems.”10  
“If the craving sufficiently interferes with the addict’s ability to grasp and 
be guided by reason, then a classic irrationality problem arises and there is 
no need to resort to compulsion as the ground for excuse.”11 
 
For Morse, control problems are rationality problems which can therefore be 
identified using a cognitive test. Morse suggests that insofar as cognitive tests for 
mitigation or excuse are failing to provide justice for people with a substance 
dependence, this is likely to be because the standards are too narrowly 
construed. The solution, in his view, is to broaden the scope of the cognitive 
                                                        
9 S.J. Morse, 'Against control tests for criminal responsibility' in P. Robinson, S. Garvey and K. Kessler 
Ferzan (eds) Criminal law conversations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 449; S.J. Morse, 
'Hooked on hype: Addiction and responsibility' (2000) 19 Law and Philosophy 3.  
10 Morse 2009 (n 9) 457-458. 
11 Morse 2000 (n 9) 38. 
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tests.12 However, as Andrew Carroll and Andrew Forrester have pointed out, in 
practice this requires judges and juries to make an inference from impaired 
control to a cognitive incapacity.13 This raises a practical question about how 
straightforwardly addiction, for example, can be understood in terms of impaired 
abilities to understand or reason.14  
 
This set of questions has been played out, among other contexts, in proposals for 
reform of the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in various 
jurisdictions of the UK.15 While a number of common law jurisdictions include an 
explicit control element within a M’Naghten-based defence,16 UK jurisdictions 
have so far retained a cognitive version of this test. In 2004, the Scottish Law 
Commission reviewed this situation and recommended against the inclusion of an 
explicit control element. Instead it proposed that the M’Naghten criterion of a 
failure to know the nature or wrongness of one’s act should be broadened to a 
failure to appreciate. In the view of the Scottish Law Commission, and consistent 
                                                        
12 Morse 2009 (n 9).  
13 A. Carroll and A. Forrester, 'Depressive rage and criminal responsibility' (2005) 12 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 36. 
14 ibid 39. Carroll and Forrester suggest that difficulties involved in making such inferences may be a 
significant barrier to defendants with control problems satisfying cognitive tests for mitigation or 
exculpation. They focus on a case concerning depressive rage in the Australian state of Victoria and 
the insanity defence in that jurisdiction. 
15 For example, in law concerning provocation: M.L. Baum, 'The monoaimine oxidase A (MAOA) 
genetic predisposition to impulsive violence: Is it relevant to criminal trials?' (2013) 6 Neuroethics 
287. 
16 The English Law Commission gives examples in Ireland, Western Australia and the US. Law 
Commission, Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automatism, A Discussion Paper (Crown Copyright 2013) 
4.45. 
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with Morse’s position, a wide interpretation of appreciate would include control 
problems, making an explicit control element redundant.17  
 
In 2013, the English Law Commission considered the same issue and departed 
from the conclusions of the Scots, recommending the inclusion of a “lack of 
control limb” as part of a new defence to replace the special verdict.18 The English 
proposal acknowledged the practical difficulties associated with a control limb in 
establishing whether a person’s capacity for control is impaired; as well as the 
argument that control problems are rationality problems and can therefore be 
accounted for within a cognitive test.19 However, it concluded, “we do not agree  
that it is always the case that irrational thinking and beliefs are all that lie behind a 
lack of control”, giving compulsive hoarding as a case in point.20  
 
These debates highlight the possibility that the presence or absence of an explicit 
impaired-control element in the relevant standards may impact upon 
determinations of legal capacity in the context of alcohol dependence. This is an 
important diagnostic context in which to address these issues. The prevalence of 
alcohol dependence is estimated at around twice the prevalence of dependence 
                                                        
17 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility (The Stationery Office, 
2004) 2.52-2.56. The Scottish report discusses the practical difficulties highlighted by Morse (2.53); 
and cited clinical opinion that no disorders are purely volitional with no cognitive impairment (2.54). 
However, it was noted that consultees were divided on the issue of whether the test should contain 
reference to volitional incapacities (2.54). Discussed in: Law Commission, Insanity and automatism 
supplementary material to the scoping paper (London: Crown Copyright, 2012) D.69-D.70. 
18 It proposed that the grounds for the new defence should be that the “defendant wholly lacked the 
capacity: (i) rationally to form a judgment about the relevant conduct or circumstances; (ii) to 
understand the wrongfulness of what he or she is charged with having done; or (iii) to control his or 
her acts in relation to the relevant conduct or circumstances.”  Law Commission 2013 (n 16) 1.93. 
19 Law Commission 2013 (n 16) A.83-A.85. 
20 Law Commission 2013 (n 16) A.86; Further discussion: Law Commission, Insanity and automatism 
scoping paper (London: Crown Copyright, 2012) 2.41-2.43. 
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on all illicit drugs, making it a serious social problem.21 It is also a complex problem 
because of the deeply embedded role for alcohol in UK culture. However, little 
attention has been paid to the way that alcohol dependence is viewed through 
mental incapacity tests in England and Wales, particularly in the civil context.  
 
This paper explores this issue with a focus on two areas of law: decisions 
concerning treatment for alcohol dependence, and responsibility for a killing. 
These are prima facie significant circumstances, and they are situations that arise 
for people who are alcohol dependent. However, the focus on these areas was 
largely predetermined by the fact that there are few contexts in which questions 
about the impact of alcohol dependence on legal capacity are raised.   
 
The analysis begins with law concerning the capacity to refuse treatment for 
alcohol dependence, and a comparison with the approach to questions of the 
capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. This comparison was chosen because 
of the significant case law in which impaired control is used to ground findings of 
mental incapacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. However, this comparison is 
made all the more relevant due to the case A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X, which 
considers mental capacity in relation to both conditions.22  
 
                                                        
21 Farrell and colleagues found rates of alcohol dependence at 5% and illegal drug dependence at just 
over 2% overall, in a household survey within England and Wales. M. Farrell, S. Howes, P. Bebbington, 
T. Brugha, R. Jenkins, G. Lewis and H. Meltzer, 'Nicotine, alcohol and drug dependence, and 
psychiatric comorbidity—results of a national household survey' (2003) 15 International Review of 
Psychiatry 50. 
22 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35. 
 10 
A debate about substance dependence and consent is then used to clarify the 
legal position in England and Wales concerning treatment refusal in relation to 
alcohol dependence and anorexia.  The analysis of the anorexia cases shows that 
the MCA’s cognitive mental capacity test can be interpreted in a wide way that 
allows control problems to be taken into account; but suggests that a narrow 
interpretation of the test has been applied in questions concerning alcohol 
dependence. 
 
The paper then moves to the criminal law, tracing developments that have made 
the defence of diminished responsibility more available to alcohol dependent 
offenders. In contrast to the MCA, the incapacity test in this context does contain 
an impaired control limb, allowing a comparison of legal reasoning and outcomes 
in the presence or absence of an explicit control element. This analysis shows that 
the presence of a control limb does not automatically mean that the test is able to 
account for control problems. The mental incapacity test in the law of diminished 
responsibility was initially interpreted in a narrow way that made the defence 
unavailable to alcohol dependent offenders, despite its explicit reference to 
impaired self-control. Judicial developments have now widened its interpretation 
so that alcohol dependence can provide grounds for diminished responsibility.  
 
These findings suggest that it is the interpretation of mental incapacity tests 
when they are applied, rather than whether they contain an explicit control 
element, that is crucial in determining outcomes in terms of legal capacity. The 
paper concludes by arguing that value judgements associated with alcohol 
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dependency and anorexia are playing a significant, unrecognised and 
inappropriate role in driving the interpretation of mental incapacity tests.  
 
2. Alcohol dependence and the capacity to refuse treatment 
Questions concerning an adult’s capacity to refuse treatment in England and 
Wales were for a long time decided using common law principles, but since 2007 
they have been governed by the MCA. Since the implementation of the MCA, a 
person lacks mental capacity if, due to “an impairment of, or disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain”,23 they are unable to (a) understand, (b) retain, 
or (c) use or weigh relevant information in coming to a decision; or (d) are unable 
to communicate their decision.24  
 
Neither the MCA nor its Code of Practice discuss substance dependence. 
However, as Lady Hale has made clear, for the purposes of the Act a person “who 
is suffering the effects of alcohol or drug use or abuse, will be impaired or 
disturbed”.25 It would seem that alcohol dependence can therefore provide the 
basis for a finding of mental incapacity, if, for the Act’s purposes, the person’s 
decision-making abilities are relevantly impaired. However, research for this paper 
found only one reported case in which alcohol dependence was considered as 
potential grounds for mental incapacity.26 In A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X, Ms X’s 
                                                        
23 s 2(1) 
24 s 3(1) 
25 B. Hale, Mental health law (London: Thomson Reuters, 5th edition, 2010) 63. 
26 This consisted of searches via the Westlaw database and consultation with experts in English 
mental health law. This paper concerns alcohol dependency rather than intoxication or conditions 
that can arise from alcohol abuse, such as Korsakoff syndrome.  
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capacity to make decisions about alcohol use arose as a side issue to the central 
question of her capacity and best interests in relation to anorexia.27  
 
Ms X was a young woman suffering from long-term anorexia and alcohol 
dependence.28 Due to an increasingly damaging cycle of imposed hospital 
admissions for anorexia, re-feeding and weight gain, followed by excessive 
alcohol consumption and deliberate weight loss, the Trust sought a declaration 
that forced treatment for Ms X’s anorexia was no longer in her best interests and 
so would be unlawful.29  
 
In its deliberations, the Court considered Ms X’s mental capacity both in relation 
to her eating disorder and her use of alcohol. Based on expert evidence, the Court 
was “entirely satisfied” that Ms X lacked capacity in relation to her anorexia.30 
However, the experts also agreed that Ms X had mental capacity in relation to her 
use of alcohol, and the Court accepted their opinion giving the following 
reasoning: 
“[The medical experts] both considered that Ms X was able to understand, 
retain, and crucially weigh up, the decision around drinking; they felt that 
her drinking was responsive to events – she appeared to be making 
choices about when to drink, when to drink more, and when to drink less. 
                                                        
27 Ms X (n 22) 
28 Ms X (n 22) 1. At the time of the hearing Ms X had been anorexic for 14 years and her alcoholism 
had resulted in end stage and irreversible liver disease. 
29 Ms X (n 22) 6. 
30 Ms X (n 22) 29. Both experts in the case held that Ms X’s false beliefs about her body and her fear of 
weight gain meant that she was unable to weigh information relevant to her eating disorder. 
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In particular, Dr. Glover was of the view that Ms X was able to weigh 
information such as the calorific content of alcohol, and appeared to be 
aware of the consequences for her liver functioning of continued abusive 
drinking, including the prospect that it could kill her”.31 
 
It followed that the Court had no jurisdiction over Ms X’s decisions around alcohol 
consumption.32 The Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) provides an alternative means 
by which an adult can be forcibly treated for a mental disorder, and this route 
does not depend on a finding of mental incapacity. However, drug and alcohol 
dependence are excluded from the MHA’s definition of a mental disorder, 
meaning that the statute does not apply directly to these conditions.33  
 
This finding of mental capacity in the context of severe alcohol dependency raises 
a question about the MCA’s ability to account for this condition—at what point 
would alcohol dependency provide grounds for a finding of mental incapacity in 
relation to alcohol use?34 Further insight into this question comes from a recent 
case in which the impact of alcohol dependence on mental capacity was 
considered as a general issue. In RB v Brighton & Hove City Council the question of 
                                                        
31 Ms X (n 22) 29. 
32 Ms X (n 22) 20. 
33 s. 1(3). A person may be treated for a substance addiction under the MHA only if treatment of the 
dependency is aimed at treating a mental disorder, as defined by the Act, that is thought to arise from 
it. The exclusion of substance dependence from the MHA’s definition has been questioned on 
grounds that dependence is often responsive to treatment, and that being an alcoholic or drug addict 
is accepted as potentially legitimate grounds for detention in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights article 5 (1) (e). R. Jones, Mental health act manual (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell Ltd, 2011)  
34 It may have been right to allow Ms X to continue in her alcohol use without legal interference, 
based on her best interests. However, as the law stands, this should not have been a factor in the 
question of her capacity to make decisions in this area. 
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capacity concerned the impact of RB’s brain injury on his ability to decide about 
where to live.35 RB had been alcohol dependent since the age of 15—many years 
before his brain injury36—and following partial rehabilitation after the brain injury 
he wished to resume his prior way of life by moving into more independent 
accommodation; a decision that was predicted to result in a return to “alcoholism 
and a chaotic lifestyle.”37 
 
On appeal, the decision that RB lacked the capacity to make this decision due to 
his brain injury was challenged on grounds that RB’s “inability to control his 
drinking is the same now as it was before the accident”.38 This argument relied on 
an assumption that RB had mental capacity in relation to his drinking prior to the 
injury; and therefore, that his alcohol dependency was unlikely to have 
undermined his capacity to make decisions in this area. While RB’s appeal was 
rejected, the Court affirmed the underlying assumption about alcohol 
dependence, holding that “an ordinary alcoholic … would not of course be made 
subject to a standard authorisation”.39 Given the context of the discussion it 
seems that “an ordinary alcoholic” refers to an alcoholic without a brain injury 
(rather than commonplace alcohol dependency). This statement therefore 
appears to support the opinion of the medical expert, who gave evidence that, 
“Alcoholics can weigh up their decisions.”40 
                                                        
35 RB v Brighton & Hove City Council [2014] EWCA Civ 561. 
36 ibid. RB was 37 at the time of the appeal hearing. 
37 ibid para 87. 
38 ibid para 33. 
39 ibid para 25. 
40 RB (n 35) para 25. 
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This position in relation to alcohol dependency stands in contrast to that adopted 
in several other common law jurisdictions. Australia41 and New Zealand,42 for 
example, have dedicated statutes that allow for involuntary detention and 
treatment on the basis of substance dependency, some of which require a loss of 
mental capacity in relation to the relevant substance.43 This difference in 
approach raises a question about whether the difficulties that people who are 
alcohol dependent can face in engaging with treatment are overlooked in English 
law; and whether this might be explained, in part, by a difficulty in accounting for 
control problems within the MCA’s cognitive test.44 
 
An examination of law concerning refusals of treatment for anorexia provides 
insight into these questions, not only because of the juxtaposition of these two 
conditions in Ms X’s tragic case. A wider examination of relevant law shows that 
questions of mental capacity in this clinical context are often framed as questions 
about impaired control in relation to weight loss, and whether this results in a 
compulsion to refuse treatment. In the reported cases, it is often found that 
                                                        
41 For a review of models in Australia: Mental Health Commission, Compulsory alcohol and other drug 
treatment in Western Australia (2016, Government of Western Australia) 9-11.  
42 Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 2017. 
43 For example, the Severe Substance Dependence Act 2010 (Victoria, Australia) only applies to 
persons who are “incapable of making decisions about his or her substance use and personal health, 
welfare and safety due primarily to the person’s dependency on the substance.” (s. 5 (c)). The Drug 
and Alcohol Treatment Act 2007 (New South Wales, Australia), does not include a loss of mental 
capacity in the assessment of whether involuntary detention and treatment is permitted. However, it 
does include restoring the person’s, “capacity to make decisions about their substance use and 
personal welfare” as one of its aims (s. 3 (1)(d)). Within New Zealand’s Substance Addiction 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 2017, compulsory treatment is permitted only if, “the 
person’s capacity to make informed decisions about treatment for the addiction is severely impaired” 
(s. 7 (b)). 
44 For a discussion of this issue in a broader context: Matthews 2014 (n 6). 
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people with acute anorexia lack mental capacity to refuse treatment on these 
grounds.  
 
3. Anorexia nervosa and the capacity to refuse treatment 
A significant body of research supports the idea that anorexia can involve a 
severely compromised ability to control the restriction of nutrition and weight 
loss.45 Participants in studies by Jacinta Tan and colleagues reported significant 
difficulties in eating and accepting treatment even if they wanted to.46 
 
In the case law both before and after the implementation of the MCA, impaired 
control is a central feature of anorexia held relevant to questions concerning the 
capacity make decisions about treatment. In Re W, the finding that W lacked the 
mental capacity to refuse treatment was based on the understanding that she 
had an “addictive illness” which “creates a compulsion to refuse treatment or to 
accept treatment that is likely to be ineffective”.47 Similarly, E in A LA v E was 
found to lack capacity due to an “obsessive fear of weight gain” that 
“overpowers all other thoughts”48; and in B v Croydon HA it was held relevant to 
the question of mental capacity that B was “unable to break out of the routine of 
                                                        
45 George Szmukler and Digby Tantum argued that anorexia should be understood as an “addiction to 
starvation”. G. Szmukler and D. Tantam, 'Anorexia nervosa: Starvation dependence' (1984) 57 British 
Journal of Medical Psychology 303, 303. 
46 J. Tan, A. Stewart, R. Fitzpatrick and T. Hope, 'Competence to make treatment decisions in anorexia 
nervosa: Thinking processes and values' (2006) 13 Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 267; J. Tan, 
T. Hope, A. Stewart and R. Fitzpatrick, 'Control and compulsory treatment in anorexia nervosa: The 
views of patients and parents' (2003) 26 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 627. 
47 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam. 64, 72, 81. 
48 A LA v E [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP) para 49. 
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punishing herself”.49 This approach to accounting for the impact of anorexia on 
the capacity to refuse treatment is now supported by the MCA’s Code of Practice, 
which states that, 
“a person with the eating disorder anorexia nervosa may understand 
information about the consequences of not eating. But, [they may 
nonetheless lack mental capacity because] their compulsion not to eat 
might be too strong for them to ignore”.50 
 
Both prior to and since the implementation of the MCA these control problems in 
anorexia were described as impairing the person’s ability to deliberate about 
treatment. For example, during cross examination in B v Croydon HA, B apparently 
understood that her weight “was getting out of hand”, but she was held 
incapable of making an informed choice because the compulsion not to eat 
rendered her unable to “appreciate the extent to which she was hazarding her 
life”.51 The desire not to gain weight in anorexia was described as giving rise to 
“deranged thought processes”52 in Re KB, and to “distorting processes” in Re C.53 
Consistent with this approach, the MCA’s Code of Practice now advises that the 
compulsive features of anorexia can undermine a person’s ability to weigh 
information regarding the risks and benefits of treatment.54 This reasoning was 
                                                        
49 This case concerned whether force feeding amounted to treatment for mental disorder under the 
Mental Health Act but mental capacity was commented on, with the Court of Appeal finding that B 
lacked mental capacity. B v Croydon HA [1995] Fam. 133, 141. 
50 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice 2007, s 4.22. 
51 B v Croydon HA (n 49) 141. 
52 Re KB (Adult) (Mental Patient: Medical Treatment) [1994] 19 BMLR 144, 145. 
53 Re C (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1997] 3 FCR 49, 67. 
54 MCA Code of Practice (n 50) s 4.21, 4.22. 
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applied in case A LA v E, when E was held able to understand, but unable to weigh 
the treatment information because of the overpowering nature of her need to 
not gain weight.55 
 
In summary, the approach found in English mental capacity law concerning 
treatment for anorexia draws close associations between the concepts of 
addiction, compulsion, impaired deliberation and mental incapacity. Descriptions 
of the experience of anorexia as being “stuck in the routine” and “like a habit you 
can’t break” are interpreted as evidence for mental incapacity;56 and such control 
problems are accounted for within the MCA’s cognitive test as an inability to 
weigh the risks and benefits of treatment.   
 
These links drawn between addiction, compulsion, impaired deliberation and 
mental incapacity show how the inference from impaired control to cognitive 
incapacity can, and is, being made within the MCA’s test. It suggests that an 
explicit control element is not necessary for taking impaired control into account 
within this structure. It also suggests that any difficulties associated with making 
such an inference do not play a central role in explaining the positions concerning 
alcohol dependency adopted in the cases of Ms X or RB. The MCA’s test could, it 
seems, be used to find that a person who is alcohol dependent lacks mental 
capacity in decisions about drinking and treatment.  
 
                                                        
55 A LA v E (n 48) para 49. 
56 B v Croydon HA (n 49) 140. 
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In the medical ethics literature, Louis Charland has used arguments very like those 
found in the anorexia cases, to defend the view that heroin dependence 
undermines capacity to consent in decisions involving heroin. His position shows 
how the argument for incapacity due to alcohol dependence might be made, and 
an analysis of this position clarifies what is at issue when questions of compulsion 
arise in cases concerning the refusal of treatment for anorexia. In the anorexia 
cases ‘compulsion’ refers to severe difficulties of control, not merely an absence 
of control. Behaviour can be willed—can involve a choice—and yet be compelled 
in the relevant legal sense. 
 
4. Heroin dependence and consenting to prescribed heroin 
Charland argues that in the context of prescribing heroin as a treatment for 
dependency on the drug, the usual presumption in favour of capacity to consent 
should be reversed.57 Central to his case is the claim that compulsion is a defining 
feature of dependence, and that it undermines the ability to “weigh risks and 
benefits” associated with heroin use.58 Charland concludes that for people who 
are heroin dependent, decision-making in connection with the drug is “warped” 
and “biased”—in the case of a clinical trial involving heroin, the “benefits are 
overweighted”—and this casts serious doubt on the person’s ability to make 
these decisions.59  
 
                                                        
57 L.C. Charland, 'Cynthia’s dilemma: Consenting to heroin prescription' (2002) 2 American Journal of 
Bioethics 37. 
58 ibid 41. His argument also relies on a related claim that “chronic heroin addiction results in radical 
changes in personal values that make seeking and using heroin the overriding goal of the addict’s 
life.” 41. 
59 ibid 43. 
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Charland’s reasoning is strikingly like that found in the English cases concerning 
refusal of treatment for anorexia. Applied to alcohol dependence in the context 
of English law, the argument would be that the compulsive features of this 
condition significantly warp or bias deliberation about drinking. Because 
treatment for alcohol dependence means not drinking—just as treatment for 
anorexia means not restricting nutrition—the alcohol dependent person’s ability 
to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment may be called into doubt.  
 
Charland’s view on this issue has provoked criticism, among others, from Bennett 
Foddy and Julian Savulescu.60 They argue that a person is compelled only when a 
substance use is “irresistible”, removing choice, and in their view this is not an 
accurate description of heroin dependence. 61 Among their supporting reasons, 
Foddy and Savulescu cite evidence that people who are heroin dependent can 
respond to strong incentives to not take the drug, and it is argued that they 
therefore retain a degree control. Understood in this way, even if a desire for 
heroin is extremely difficult to resist, use of the drug is always “volitional”62—it 
flows from the will rather than being a reflex or an epileptic seizure. Only a 
complete loss of control removes choice, rendering a behavior irresistible, and so 
heroin use is not compelled.63  
 
                                                        
60 B. Foddy and J. Savulescu, 'Addiction and autonomy: Can addicted people consent to the 
presectipion of their drug of addiction?' (2006) 20 Bioethics 1. 
61 ibid 6, 7. 
62 ibid 11. 
63 Hanna Pickard is another theorist who adopts this understanding of compulsion, when she 
contrasts compulsion with duress. H. Pickard, 'The purpose of chronic addiction' (2012) 3 AJOB 
Neuroscience 40. 
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However, while Foddy and Savulescu’s interpretation of compulsion as a 
complete loss of control is one plausible view, it does not square with the use of 
this term in English law concerning the refusal of treatment for anorexia. Where 
compulsion is given as grounds for incapacity due to anorexia, it is most often 
described in terms of extreme distortions and biases in the decision process, 
rather than the person being deprived of a choice. In Re C, C was understood to 
be making a choice when it was said that, “worries about the effects on the body, 
and eventually threats to life itself, are ignored”.64 Similarly in Re W, compulsion 
in anorexia is said to involve “a firm wish not to be cured, or at least not to be 
cured unless and until the sufferer wishes to cure herself”, indicating that an 
anorexic person’s refusal of treatment is at least in part an expression of their 
current desires.65 Reflecting the understanding of compulsion found in these 
cases, the MCA’s Code of Practice advises that an anorexic person’s “compulsion 
not to eat might be too strong for them to ignore”.66 These descriptions clearly 
imply that the relevant decisions are volitions: they flow from the person’s beliefs 
and desires, even if their mental powers may be impaired. In these descriptions, 
the anorexic person is making a choice to refuse treatment yet this choice is 
compelled—a logical impossibility on Foddy and Savulescu’s view. 
 
The understanding of compulsion in this part of English law is therefore wider 
than that proposed by Foddy and Savulescu in their analysis of heroin 
                                                        
64 Re C (n 53) 67. We note, however, that it is also suggested that C had no control over the desire for 
the “gratification involved in being able to override pangs of hunger” 67. 
65 Re W (n 47) 73. 
66 MCA Code of Practice (n 50) s 4.22. 
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dependency. As a matter of English law, severe difficulties of control in anorexia, 
not merely an absence of control, can ground a finding of mental incapacity in 
relation to treatment. This understanding of compulsion has also been endorsed 
in the philosophical literature concerning addiction, with Jeanette Kennett 
arguing that compulsion is: 
 
“motivation that it is largely impervious, both to the agent’s values and to 
common techniques of self-control. This is consistent with the claim that 
the behaviour is intentional”. 67 
 
Alcohol dependence could therefore involve compulsion in the relevant legal 
sense, resulting in a mental incapacity, even though drinking always involves a 
choice. The crucial legal issue in England and Wales is not whether the desire for 
alcohol is irresistible in the sense that drinking that is not willed, but rather the 
severity of the person’s difficulties in weighing the risks and benefits in decisions 
about treatment.  
 
5. Revisiting the case of Ms X 
With this clarification in hand, we can now revisit the decision that Ms X had 
mental capacity in relation to her alcohol dependence. The justification given for 
this finding was that Ms X’s decisions about drinking responded to considerations 
                                                        
67 J. Kennett, 'Addiction, choice and disease: How voluntary is action in addiction?' in N. Vincent (ed) 
Neuroscience and legal responsibility (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2013) 257. 
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other than her desire for alcohol, and that she therefore retained the ability to 
weigh in this area.  
 
One interpretation of this reasoning is that it reflects the approach found in the 
anorexia cases. Understood in this way, Ms X’s weighing of other considerations 
was taken as evidence of a sufficient degree of responsiveness to reasons: Ms X 
retained enough control in her choices about drinking to retain legal capacity in 
relation to treatment. It is puzzling, however, that the main countervailing reason 
cited by the Court was the calorific content of alcohol. The experts and Court 
were firmly of the opinion that Ms X’s fear of weight gain resulted in a mental 
incapacity in relation to her anorexia. The fact that this same consideration played 
a role in her decisions about drinking does not therefore seem like good evidence 
that she retained sufficient control—understood as an ability to weigh—in 
relation to her drinking. 
 
An alternative interpretation of the Court’s reasoning is that any responsiveness 
to considerations other than the desire for alcohol was taken to demonstrate Ms 
X’s ability to weigh in her decisions about drinking. So long as she demonstrated a 
choice to drink, the ability to weigh this decision was preserved, in line with Foddy 
and Savulescu’s narrow approach to the understanding of compulsion. The 
conclusions that can be drawn here are necessarily speculative. However, the 
expert opinion that Ms X “appeared to be making choices about when to drink”68 
was accepted as evidence of her mental capacity in this area. This provides some 
                                                        
68 Ms X (n 22) para 30. 
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evidence that a narrow approach was applied: a choice to drink meant that the 
ability to weigh was not relevantly impaired no matter what difficulties in resisting 
drinking, might have been involved.  
 
If this second analysis is correct then the interpretation of the MCA’s test applied 
to Ms X’s alcohol dependence was markedly different to the interpretation 
applied in the anorexia cases. A question is also raised about whether this reflects 
the approach taken in wider practice, given that most mental capacity decisions 
don’t come to court. However, even if there is such a divergence of approach 
between these two diagnostic contexts, it might be argued that this is warranted. 
Two possible justifications are briefly considered. 
 
One potential justification might be based on the claim that the stakes are higher 
in decisions concerning treatment for anorexia, and that this provides a reason to 
apply the mental incapacity test in a more stringent way. The underlying risk-
relativity principle was part of common law prior to the MCA, but it is now 
endorsed only when the higher stakes mean the decision is more complex.69 The 
main problem for this form of justification concerns the underlying facts. There 
were 8,416 reported deaths in the UK in 2013 due to diseases that result directly 
                                                        
69 Prior to the MCA the authority on this issue was Lord Donaldson in Re T: “What matters is that the 
doctors should consider whether at that time he had a capacity which was commensurate with the 
gravity of the decision which he purported to make. The more serious the decision, the greater the 
capacity required. If the patient had the requisite capacity, they are bound by his decision. If not, they 
are free to treat him in what they believe to be his best interests." ReT (Adult: refusal of treatment) 
[1993] Fam 95. 
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from alcohol consumption, in particular cirrhosis of the liver.70 The statistics 
clearly indicate a direct link between long-term alcohol abuse and death and in 
this sense the risks associated with alcohol dependence could not be higher. It 
may be that the predictability of death within a timeframe is more 
straightforward in malnutrition than in liver failure, but this seems a tenuous basis 
for a claim that the decision about treatment is therefore more complex. 
 
Another potential justification might be based on a claim that forced treatment is 
unlikely to be in the alcohol dependent person’s best interests. Bernadette 
McSherry, for example, has noted a lack of evidence regarding the efficacy of civil 
commitment as a response to alcoholism.71 The question of mental capacity is 
independent of the person’s best interests in England and Wales. Nonetheless, 
there may be a reluctance to consider the question of mental capacity if a finding 
of incapacity would make no practical difference, because treatment would never 
be imposed. This line of thinking may play a part in explaining the small number of 
reported cases to consider the impact of alcohol dependence on the capacity to 
decide about treatment. However, serious concerns have also been raised about 
best interests in relation to forced treatment for anorexia. It has been argued that 
                                                        
70 This figure does not include accidental or violent deaths where alcohol abuse may have been a 
factor (other than deaths due to alcohol poisoning) or diseases where alcohol is known to play a 
partial causal role such as in certain cancers.  
71 B. McSherry and S. Lenthall, 'Laws to detain individuals with substance dependency: Breaching 
human rights or restoring health?' (2011) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 225; Stephen Morse also 
refers to the “undoubted but limited success of available treatment programs”, Morse 2000 (n 9) 23; 
More recent empirical data on the outcomes of compulsory treatment for substance dependency is 
discussed by Steve Matthews, who draws the conclusion that the results are uncertain: Matthews 
forthcoming (n 6). 
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involuntary treatment can lead to a breakdown of trust with professionals72 and 
can result in chronicity that may make recovery less likely.73 The significant 
concerns in both clinical contexts suggest that this issue does not distinguish 
these conditions in a way that would justify adopting different approaches to the 
assessment of mental capacity.  
 
In the absence of an obvious justification for the apparent difference in how the 
MCA’s test has been applied in the context of alcohol dependency and anorexia, 
the final sections of this paper offer an explanation based on the very different 
value judgements associated with these two conditions. This proposal also raises 
wider concerns about the role that evaluative and other social inputs may be 
playing when the MCA’s mental capacity test is interpreted and applied in 
practice.  
 
However, the paper first examines how the impact of alcohol dependence on 
mental capacities is approached within the defence of diminished responsibility, 
using its test which contains an explicit control limb. The analysis traces an 
attempt in the criminal courts to make it possible for defendants to successfully 
plead diminished responsibility due to alcohol dependence. This has involved a 
shift in the understanding of ‘involuntary drinking’ from a narrow interpretation 
                                                        
72 J. Tan, A. Stewart and T. Hope, Treatment decision-making in anorexia nervosa, an empirical ethics 
research validation and dissemination project (Oxford: The Ethox Centre, 2008).  
73 H. Bruche, The golden cage: The enigma of anorexia nervosa (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1979) 97-99; T. Carney, D. Tait and S. Touyz, 'Coercion is coercion? Reflections on clinical trends 
in use of compulsion in treating anorexia nervosa' (2007) 15 Australasian Psychiatry 390; S. Giordano, 
'Treating eating disorders: Some legal and ethical issues' in J.R.E. Fox and K. Goss (eds) Eating and its 
disorders (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2012) 102. 
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based on the absence of choice, to a wider interpretation referring to an impaired 
capacity for control. These developments engage with similar issues to those 
identified in the case of Ms X, illustrating that these difficulties are not avoided by 
the presence of an explicit impaired control element within an incapacity test. 
 
6. Diminished responsibility for a killing 
Alcohol dependency is rarely considered as a potential mitigating or excusing 
factor for a criminal offence, though several commentators have called for 
changes to existing defences or the development of new defences, to allow 
substance dependency to be taken into account.74 The partial defence of 
diminished responsibility is the only place in English law where attempts have 
been made to use alcohol dependence per se to ground criminal mitigation or 
excuse.75  
 
Over the past decade there has been an attempt to make this defence more 
available to alcohol dependent offenders, and these developments have 
addressed similar issues to those identified in the civil law above. The law of 
diminished responsibility was significantly changed in 2009. However, many of the 
important cases in relation to alcohol dependence pre-date those changes. Rather 
than providing an overview of developments in relation to diminished 
responsibility and alcohol dependency, this section of the paper focusses on a 
                                                        
74 Morse 2000 (n 9); J. Tolmie, 'Alchoholism and criminal liability' (2001) 63 Modern Law Review 688; 
G. Yaffe, 'Lowering the bar for addicts' in J. Poland and G. Graham (eds) Addiction and responsibility 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2011) 178. 
75 On the other hand, there is a significant literature on intoxication and criminal liability in England 
and Wales, for example: J. Herring, C. Regan and D. Weinberg (eds) Intoxication and Society: 
Problematic Pleasures of Drugs and Alcohol (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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crucial shift in how the impaired-control limb within the law of diminished 
responsibility has been interpreted.76 
 
Prior to the 2009 amendments, the Homicide Act 1957 provided that a person 
who kills, or is party to a killing, should not be found guilty of murder,  
“if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind … as substantially 
impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or 
being a party to the killing”77  
An abnormality of mind in this context included, “not only the perception of 
physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment whether an 
act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will-power to control physical 
acts in accordance with that rational judgment.”78 
Among the 2009 amendments, an “abnormality of mind” became an 
“abnormality of mental functioning”, although it was anticipated that the terms 
would not significantly differ79 and this has been confirmed in relation to alcohol 
dependency.80 The changes also modified the capacities relevant to mental 
responsibility by introducing three categories of ability—understanding, rational 
                                                        
76 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52(1). For a thorough analysis of these developments see: N. 
Wake ‘Recognising acute intoxication in diminished responsibility? A comparative analysis?’ (2012) 76 
Journal of Criminal Law 71; M. Gibson, 'Intoxicants and diminished responsibility: The impact of the 
coroners and justice act 2009' (2011) 12 Criminal law Review 909;  R.D. Mackay, 'The coroners and 
justice act 2009 - partial defences to murder (2) the diminished responsibility plea' (2010) 4 Criminal 
law Review 290. 
77 Homicide Act 1957, s. 2(1). 
78 R. v Byrne [1960] 2 QB, 396, 403. 
79 Gibson (n 76);  Mackay (n 76). 
80 R. Adrian Joseph Barry [2010] EWCA Crim 195; R. v Martin John Bunch [2013] EWCA Crim 2498; R. v 
Williams (Dean) [2013] EWCA Crim 2749, [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. 23; R. v Ashby (Martyn) [2015] EWCA 
Crim 712; R. v Richardson (James) [2016] EWCA Crim 577. 
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judgment and self-control—at least one of which must be substantially 
impaired.81 As summarised in R. v Martin John Bunch, the central issue for the 
alcohol dependent offender is now whether he or she,  
“was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which arose 
from that medical condition [alcohol dependency syndrome] and which 
substantially impaired one of the three capacities mentioned in the Act.”82  
Crucially, the new statutory definition retains an explicit control element, 
although this was modified from an ability to “exercise will-power to control 
physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment”83 to an ability to 
“exercise self-control”.84 It is this element that has been used to argue for 
diminished responsibility on grounds of alcohol dependency. However, difficulties 
originally arose in defining and applying a test for a substantial impairment in this 
ability. 
 
7. Diminished responsibility and involuntary drinking 
The case of R. v Tandy85 established that chronic alcoholism86 could be an 
abnormality of mind that substantially impaired mental responsibility for a killing. 
                                                        
81 The 2009 changes also introduced direct causal link between the alcohol dependency and the killing 
(Mackay (n 76)). This appears to go further than the House of Lords ruling in Dietschmann, which held 
that as long as the abnormality of mind existed at the time of the killing, and was a more than trivial 
cause of that act, it could be used to raise a plea of diminished responsibility (R. v Dietschmann [2003] 
1 AC 1209, para 18). Commentators raised concern that this may close down diminished responsibility 
for the alcohol dependent offender (Gibson (n 76)). However, we found no evidence that this has 
been the case.  
82 R. v Martin John Bunch [2013] EWCA Crim 2498, para 10. 
83 R. v Byrne (n 78) 403. 
84 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52(1A) (c). 
85 R. v Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350. 
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Tandy, a chronic alcoholic who strangled her daughter after consuming 90% of a 
bottle of vodka, was, however, unsuccessful in pleading diminished responsibility 
and convicted of murder.  
 
The failure of the defence was due to Tandy’s inability to satisfy the Court’s test 
for whether her control in relation to drinking was relevantly impaired. In the 
absence of brain damage, which at that time was accepted as proof of an 
abnormality of mind,87 Tandy was required to prove that her consumption of 
alcohol prior to the killing was “involuntary” due to her alcoholism.88 The Court 
directed that this meant Tandy had to have “no immediate control” over her 
consumption of alcohol.89 The craving for alcohol had to be irresistible in the 
sense that “the use of drink or drugs [was] involuntary”.90 Drawing a sharp 
distinction between a choice to drink and an abnormality of mind caused by 
disease, the Court of Appeal supported the trial judge’s direction that:  
“The choice [of whether to drink or not to drink on the day of the killing] 
may not have been easy but …if it was there at all it is fatal to this 
defence…. [If Tandy did drink] as a matter of choice, she cannot say in law 
                                                                                                                                                              
86 In Tandy, this terminology was used rather than alcohol dependency syndrome, which was adopted 
in later cases. 
87 This position was modified in Wood with the Court of Appeal holding that the involuntary drinking 
test should be applied whether or not the defendant had brain damage, although it was accepted 
that evidence of brain damage may make the case for an abnormality of mind more compelling. R. v 
Wood [2008] EWCA Crim 1305, para 41. For discussion see: Wake (n 76). 
88 Tandy (n 85) 356. 
89 Tandy (n 85) 354. 
90 Tandy (n 85) 357. 
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or in common sense that the abnormality of mind which resulted was 
induced by disease.” 91 
 
Applying the Court’s test for a substantial impairment of self-control,92 the jury 
were not persuaded that Tandy did not have a choice.93 However, Tandy raised 
the question of whether alcohol dependence could ever result in involuntary 
drinking in the required sense, and was heavily criticised on this basis. Julia Tolmie 
argued that the requirement of a total loss of control effectively took the defence 
of diminished responsibility away from people who are alcohol dependent.94 
Similarly, Jonathon Goodliffe criticised the stark approach to assessing problems 
of control: 
“The Court of Appeal in Tandy were able to accept the adoption of 
diminished responsibility as it applies to alcoholism only in terms of black 
and white, rather than shades of grey: either the Defendant was wholly 
incapable of resisting the impulse to drink or she was responsible for her 
actions and should be convicted of murder.”95 
 
                                                        
91 Tandy (n 85) 355. 
92 Tandy (n 85) 354. 
93 The Court of Appeal held the following to be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reach its 
verdict: The prosecution medical evidence that Tandy had the ability to abstain from taking the first 
drink on the day of the killing; Tandy’s own evidence that she had chosen to drink a stronger drink on 
the day of the killing, and that she might not have had a drink the day before; and that she had 
stopped before the bottle was empty. Tandy (n 85) 356. 
94 Tolmie (n 74).  
95 J. Goodliffe, 'R v Tandy and the concept of alcoholism as a disease' (1990) 53 The Modern Law 
Review 809, 810. As Gideon Yaffe has observed more broadly in the criminal context: “[I]f addiction 
does diminish responsibility it is not for the reason that, say, epilepsy diminishes responsibility. The 
epileptic might do damage when in the fit of a seizure, but she is not responsible for that damage 
since her spasmodic movements are not motivated. … But behavior stemming from addiction is not 
like this.” G. Yaffe, 'Recent work on addiction and responsible agency' (2002) 30 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 178, 179.   
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In 2008 and 2009 the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to reassess Tandy96 in 
the cases of R. v Wood97 and R. v Stewart98 in which the defendants were 
diagnosed by all experts as suffering from alcohol dependency syndrome.99 In the 
trial of Wood the defence of diminished responsibility was rejected following the 
direction of the trail judge that, in accordance with Tandy: 
“A man’s act is involuntary if, and only if, he could not have acted 
otherwise. Giving into a craving is not an involuntary act, even if it is very 
difficult to do otherwise.”100 
 
However, in Wood’s appeal the Court held that Tandy had imposed a strict test for 
a relevant impairment in the capacity for control, that, as in other prior cases,101 
was being very literally applied. The Court held that giving into a craving for 
alcohol could in fact constitute an involuntary act, confirming that, in law, an 
irresistible craving for alcohol can occur. According to this reassessment, a choice 
to drink in the context of alcohol dependency can be involuntary.102  
 
                                                        
96 In a general review of the partial defences to murder, the Law Commission recognised that there 
was a problem with the test for diminished responsibility adopted in Tandy, and it recommended that 
the issue should be resolved by judicial development. Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, 
report No 290 (2004), para 5.85. 
97 Wood (n 87). 
98 R. v Stewart [2009] EWCA Crim 593. 
99 In both cases a conviction of murder was quashed based on this reassessment. In Wood the Court 
of Appeal invited submissions on “whether a new trial should be ordered, or whether a conviction for 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility should be entered.” Wood (n 87) para 43. 
In Stewart, a retrial before a jury was ordered (n 98) para 25. On retrial Stewart was convicted of 
murder, and a further appeal was dismissed. R. v  Stewart [2010] EWCA Crim 2159. 
100 Wood (n 87) para 18. 
101 R. v Inseal [1992] Crim. L.R.35; R. v Atkinson [1985] Crim. L.R. 314; R. v Egan [1992] 95 CAR 278. 
102 Wood (n 87) para 42.  
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There was also a shift of focus in Wood103 and Stewart104 away from the medical 
status of alcohol dependency. The critical issue in Tandy appears to have been 
whether Tandy suffered an “abnormality of mind … induced by disease”105 and it 
was to this issue that the question of involuntary drinking was applied.106 
However, Wood confirmed the Court’s acceptance, by then, that alcohol 
dependency is “a true psychiatric condition”.107 This development raised a 
question about the role for the issue of involuntary drinking. The Court of Appeal 
set out that this issue is key both to the assessment of whether an individual 
suffered from an abnormality of mind resulting from alcohol dependency at the 
time of the killing;108 and if this element is made out, to the assessment of 
whether mental responsibility was substantially impaired.109 In Stewart, the Court 
of Appeal emphasised that, “[It] does not necessarily follow from the fact that a 
defendant suffers from alcohol dependency syndrome that he has established the 
necessary abnormality of mind.”110 
 
                                                        
103 Wood (n 87) para 9. 
104 Stewart (n 98). 
105 As defined in section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 prior to its amendment in 2009. 
106 Tandy (n 85) 354. 
107 Wood (n 87) para 9; Stewart (n 99) para 9.  
108 “This depends on the jury’s findings about the nature and extent of the syndrome and whether, 
looking at the matter broadly, his consumption of alcohol before the killing is fairly to be regarded as 
the involuntary result of an irresistible craving for or compulsion to drink.” Stewart (n 98) para 31. 
109 In Wood the Court of Appeal was clear that in resolving this issue, “questions such as whether the 
defendant's craving for alcohol was or was not irresistible, and whether his consumption of alcohol in 
the period leading up to the killing was voluntary (and if so, to what extent) or was not voluntary” are 
central. Wood (n 87) para 41. 
On this same issue, in Stewart the Court advised that juries be invited to consider the difference 
between a failure to resist, and an inability to resist an impulse. Stewart (n 98) 33. Issues that were 
indicated as potentially relevant to this question were: the seriousness of the offender’s dependency; 
the extent to which the ability to control his drinking was reduced; his ability to abstain; his pattern 
of, and reasons for, drinking around the time of the offence; and his ability at the relevant time, to 
make rational decisions about day-to-day matters. Stewart (n 98) para 34. 
110 Stewart (n 98) para 31. 
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8. Complexities and further developments in the involuntary drinking test 
Stewart’s trial, however, foreshadowed challenges in the implementation of the 
revised test for involuntary drinking. In keeping with the reassessment set out in 
Wood, the defence expert concluded that Stewart’s “compulsion to drink was 
very great”, his “appetite for alcohol was overpowering”, and that “he had lost 
the ability voluntarily to control/resist a drink”.111 The prosecution expert, 
however, gave evidence that, “however chronic the alcoholism, an alcoholic 
always had a choice whether to drink”, that “alcohol dependence was not a 
disease in the typical sense like pneumonia, a condition over which the sufferer 
had no control”, and that, “[rather] than a disease alcoholism was a habit”.112 The 
Court of Appeal refrained from commenting on the expert’s opinion,113 but 
confirmed that, in law, an irresistible craving can occur in alcohol dependency. 
 
Similar difficulties appear to have arisen in the more recent trial of R. v Williams114 
where an unused report by a medical expert was said by the Court of Appeal to 
rely on the approach in Tandy.115 However, a recent case indicates that there may 
be a growing acceptance in practice, of the revised understanding of involuntary 
drinking. In R. v Richardson116 the Crown accepted a guilty plea of diminished 
responsibility due to alcohol dependency. The sentence was challenged by the 
                                                        
111 Stewart (n 98) para 12. 
112 Stewart (n 98) para 13. 
113 Stewart (n 98) para 25. 
114 R. v Williams (Dean) [2013] EWCA Crim 2749. 
115 ibid para 11. The Court of Appeal’s review of fresh evidence in this case found that in relation the 
question of mental responsibility, Williams’ “judgement and ability to control his impulses were 
seriously and significantly impaired” due to alcohol dependency (ibid para 10), and a retrial was 
ordered. 
116 R. v Richardson (James) [2016] EWCA Crim 577. 
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Solicitor-General and was found by the Court of Appeal to be “unduly lenient”,117 
but it was held that the Crown’s acceptance of the plea was nonetheless “entirely 
proper”.118 
 
One emerging theme from the reported cases post-Wood and Stewart is an 
apparent shift in relation to the issue of an abnormality of mental functioning. In 
R. v Barry,119 at trial and on appeal it was accepted that Barry was suffering from 
alcohol dependency at the time of the killing, and that this amounted to an 
abnormality of mind.120 In support of this position, the Court of Appeal outlined 
the prosecution’s expert evidence concerning the defendant’s “strong 
compulsion” to drink, and his “difficulty in controlling” his use of alcohol as well 
as withdrawal symptoms and tolerance to the effects of alcohol.121 However, the 
expert “was unable to say whether the appellant’s drinking had been voluntary or 
involuntary on the night in question” and the defence’s medical expert report was 
said to have nothing to add.122 Contrary to the approach outlined in Stewart,123 it 
appears that in Barry the issue of involuntary drinking was not used to determine 
whether the defendant’s alcohol dependency amounted to an abnormality of 
mind.  
 
                                                        
117 ibid para 32.  
118 ibid para 2. 
119 R. v Barry [2010] EWCA Crim 195. Barry was found guilty of murder and on appeal the conviction 
was found to be safe.  
120 ibid para 3.  
121 ibid para 10. 
122 ibid para 11. 
123 Stewart (n 98) para 33. 
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Further insight is provided by two other recent cases. In R. v Williams, the Court of 
Appeal indicated that an abnormality of mental functioning followed 
straightforwardly from a diagnosis of alcohol dependency. According to the 
Court, Williams “was suffering from an abnormality of mind, that is to say Alcohol 
Dependency Syndrome”,124 with the issue of voluntariness not raised until the 
discussion of Williams’ mental responsibility. In R. v Ashby,125 the trial judge 
directed that the jury should consider whether Ashby was suffering from alcohol 
dependency syndrome at the time of the killing, and if he was, “the jury were then 
asked to consider on the balance of probabilities the applicant’s responsibility for 
stabling [sic] the victim was substantially impaired by the abnormality of his 
mind.”126 These directions leave no room for the possibility that the defendant 
may have been suffering from alcohol dependency, but not an abnormality of 
mental functioning, and the Court of Appeal made no criticism of these directions.  
 
These observations suggest that the issue of an abnormality of mental 
functioning is now being tied closely to a diagnosis of alcohol dependency.127   
Concerns were previously raised that the 2009 amendments to the law of 
diminished responsibility would bring further complexity to attempts to take 
alcohol dependence into account. It was suggested that increasing the number of 
                                                        
124 Williams (n 114). This opinion appears to have been based on expert evidence that his “ability to 
control his drinking was practically non-existent” (n 114) para 10. 
125 R. v Ashby (Martyn) [2015] EWCA Crim 712, para 20. 
126 Ashby (n 125) para 16. Ashby’s appeal was rejected on the basis that fresh evidence concerning 
alcohol dependency would not raise reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 
127 For a discussion of a ‘recognised medical condition’ within the defence of diminished 
responsibility, particularly its relationship with diagnostic manuals, see R. v Dowds, which concerned 
voluntary alcohol intoxication. R. v Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281. 
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issues that could be disputed and which require medical expert opinion to 
resolve, is likely to result in more contested pleas, which juries are less likely to 
accept.128 In relation to these concerns, the reported cases since the amendments 
came into force only provide limited insight. However, the impression given is 
that the approach to the alcohol dependent offender has not significantly 
changed. The shift to a more medicalised understanding of abnormal mental 
functioning may even have simplified this element of the defence by replacing the 
more nebulous issue of involuntary drinking.129 
 
Nonetheless, these cases provide no insight into whether these developments 
have translated into a greater willingness on the part of juries, to accept a plea of 
diminished responsibility on grounds of alcohol dependency. The voluntariness of 
the defendant’s drinking at the relevant time remains the crucial issue in relation 
to responsibility. In the reported cases, there have been problems with the 
experts’ implementation of the revised involuntary drinking test, and juries may 
well be encountering the same difficulties. 
 
9. What then is the legal position of the person who is alcohol dependent? 
For persons who are alcohol dependent in England and Wales, questions of legal 
capacity in relation to decisions about treatment and in relation to their 
responsibility for a killing, turn on the person’s ability to control their drinking. 
                                                        
128 Mackay (n 76); Gibson (n 76). 
129 It was always required that the abnormality arose from a medical condition. Pre-2009 it was 
required that the abnormality arose, “from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind 
or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury” (n 77) s. 2(1); and post-2009, “from a 
recognised medical condition” (n 84) s. (1)(a). 
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However, the standard used to make this determination is different in these two 
contexts. The crucial element of the MCA’s cognitive test is the person’s ability to 
weigh the risks and benefits of alcohol use and treatment. The crucial element of 
the law of diminished responsibility now concerns whether the person was 
substantially impaired in their ability to exercise self-control; which turns on 
whether the person’s drinking was involuntary due to an irresistible craving for 
alcohol. 
 
As described above, recent years have seen a shift in the law of diminished 
responsibility. Prior to Wood, the involuntary drinking test required a complete 
loss of control over drinking at the relevant time, which was incompatible with a 
choice to drink. However, judicial developments shifted the question of 
involuntary drinking into a grey area that concerns degrees of control, making this 
defence available in practice on grounds of alcohol dependency.  
 
This has brought the approach to problems of control in the law of diminished 
responsibility significantly into alignment with that found in cases concerning the 
capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia. Here impaired control can provide a 
basis for a finding of mental incapacity even though the person’s refusal of 
treatment was a choice. Despite the MCA’s test being cognitive, and the test 
within the law of diminished responsibility containing an explicit control element, 
both allow volitional impairments to be taken into account. In both contexts, this 
is made possible by a wide interpretation of the relevant test, which allows 
impaired control, not merely an absence of control, to impact upon legal capacity.  
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However, the available evidence leads us to suggest that this wide approach is 
not being used in treatment decisions about alcohol dependency.130 We found no 
evidence of alcohol dependency being accepted as grounds for mental incapacity 
in relation to decisions about drinking or treatment; and only little evidence of the 
issue being considered at all. In the case of Ms X, the justification for the finding of 
mental capacity made particular reference to the idea that Ms X was making 
choices about drinking, suggesting that a narrow interpretation of the MCA’s test 
was applied. 
 
These observations suggest that people who are alcohol dependent are in the 
following position. Their legal capacity is likely to be fully recognised in the 
context of decisions about treatment for alcohol dependency, even if their 
alcohol use is life-threatening. At the same point in time, if the person kills, their 
dependency may provide grounds for the partial withholding of legal capacity in 
relation to the killing, through a finding of diminished responsibility. The above 
analysis suggests this situation is sustained by a narrower interpretation of the 
relevant incapacity test in decisions about treatment for alcohol dependency.131 
This narrow interpretation of the MCA’s test also contrasts with the wider 
interpretation of the same test in questions concerning treatment for anorexia, 
which has enabled findings of mental incapacity in this diagnostic context. 
                                                        
130 What happens in practice is unclear because the majority of decisions about mental capacity do 
not come to court, and until recently, of those that did, only a selection were reported. 
131 The case of RB suggests that people who are alcohol dependent retain the ability to weigh in 
relation to their drinking (n 35); and the observation that Ms X made a choice to drink was accepted 
as evidence of her mental capacity in this area (n 22).  
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This situation raises a question about whether the difficulties that people with 
alcohol dependency may face in making decisions about treatment are being 
properly considered. It also raises a question about the desirability of the 
apparent flexibility within mental incapacity tests; and the drivers that are 
determining which interpretation will be applied in a particular context. 
 
10. Normative analysis: differences between legal contexts 
Divergences in approach to mental and legal capacity across legal and clinical 
contexts are not necessarily problematic. Section five considered two possible 
justifications for adopting different approaches to applying the MCA’s incapacity 
test in the context of anorexia and alcohol dependency. The paper returns to this 
issue later in this section, but it begins by considering some potential justifications 
for adopting different approaches to mental incapacity across the contexts of 
treatment decisions and diminished responsibility for a killing. 
 
One important difference between the two legal contexts under consideration is 
that responsibility is only partially withheld in the defence of diminished 
responsibility. There is no equivalent outcome afforded within the MCA—for 
example, involving supported decision-making.132 In the absence of a middle 
ground within the MCA, the implementation of its test in a way that errs on the 
                                                        
132 Either the person is judged to have mental capacity and their decision is respected; or they are 
deemed to lack mental capacity and a decision is made in their best interests. 
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side of preserving legal capacity seems fitting with its guiding principles, which to 
some degree prioritise non-interference over the protection of well-being.133 
 
However, this way of justifying the narrow interpretation of the MCA’s test in the 
context of alcohol dependency, is called into question by the anorexia cases.134 
The wide approach to control problems in this diagnostic context has enabled 
interference in treatment decisions about anorexia, undermining any general 
appeal to the value of non-interference as a way of justifying the approach to 
alcohol dependency in decisions about alcohol use and treatment. In the absence 
of a plausible justification for applying different interpretations of the MCA’s 
‘ability to weigh’ criterion in these two diagnostic contexts, there are broadly 
three ways to resolve this tension.  
 
(1) One is to conclude that the incapacity test being applied in decisions about 
alcohol use is unduly narrow, perhaps making it impossible for someone to lack 
mental capacity in this diagnostic context. The narrow approach to control 
problems applied in the criminal case of Tandy provides a useful comparison, 
showing how in theory a finding of mental incapacity might be possible, without 
this being the case in practice. Based on the above analysis, we suspect that this is 
                                                        
133 This position is reflected, for example, in the principle that: “A person must be assumed to have 
capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.” s. 1(2); and that, “A person is not to be treated 
as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken 
without success.” s. 1(3).  
If a complete defence to murder was the only option for those who kill, it seems likely that lawmakers 
would be less willing to interpret the incapacity test within this defence in a way that would make it 
available based on alcohol dependency. 
134 When control is perceived to be the central issue in this diagnostic context, a person can lack the 
ability to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment, despite having made a choice. 
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currently the case when the MCA is applied to questions of alcohol dependency 
and alcohol use or treatment.  
 
As a remedy, lawmakers could bring the approach to assessing mental capacity in 
relation to alcohol dependency into line with that seen in the cases concerning 
treatment for anorexia. This would also bring into alignment the approach to 
assessing mental abilities in alcohol dependency across the treatment decision 
and diminished responsibility contexts. However, against this solution it might be 
argued that there are good reasons to adopt a narrower approach in the 
treatment decision context than in the law of diminished responsibility.135 It was 
argued above that non-interference is the most prominent value reflected in the 
MCA’s guiding principles, and that this provides a reason to interpret its incapacity 
test in a narrow way, prioritising the recognition of legal capacity. But what are 
the central values in law concerning a killing? Here, significant weight will be given 
to value of the lives of others, and this consideration also pushes in the direction 
of recognising legal capacity, to enable blame and punishment.136 However, 
criminal law also places weight on the value of freedom, as reflected, for 
example, in the presumption of innocence in criminal trials.137 This consideration 
pushes in the opposite direction, towards a finding of diminished responsibility 
when responsibility is in doubt. If these two considerations are equally weighty, 
                                                        
135 For a broader discussion of this issue: J. Craigie, 'Against a singular understanding of legal cpacity: 
Criminal responsibility and the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities' (2015) 40 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 6. 
136 Carroll and Forrester (n 14).  
137 These are offered as just two key considerations, acknowledging that this is far from a complete 
analysis of the normative underpinnings of criminal law. 
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this suggests that a wider approach to control problems may be appropriate in 
the law of diminished responsibility than in the MCA. 
 
(2) This points to an alternative solution, suggesting that the interpretation of the 
incapacity test applied in the anorexia cases may have been inappropriately wide, 
enabling interference where this was not warranted.138 Rather, on this thinking, 
the approach seen in relation to treatment for alcohol dependency better reflects 
the values of the MCA, and the normative differences between the civil and 
criminal contexts. The solution would be to narrow the interpretation of the 
incapacity test applied in treatment decisions about anorexia, bringing the 
approach in this context into alignment with that seen when the MCA is applied 
to questions of alcohol dependency, alcohol use and treatment. 
 
(3) A third response holds that there is truth in both the first and second 
responses, and calls for a reconsideration of practice in light of these concerns. 
This is the remedy we endorse.  The above analysis suggests that insufficient 
consideration is being given to the difficulties that people who are alcohol-
dependent can face in relation to decisions about use and treatment. However, it 
also seems plausible that the interpretation of the MCA’s test in the anorexia 
cases has been inappropriately wide, too easily enabling interference in this 
diagnostic context. As one part of understanding how this situation may have 
come to be, and how it might be addressed, it is argued below that value 
                                                        
138 C. Kong, ‘Beyond the balancing scales: the importance of prejudice and dialogue in A local 
authority v E and others’ (2014) 26 Child and Family Law Quarterly 216. 
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judgements have played an inappropriate role in shaping the interpretation of the 
MCA’s test, when it is applied. 
 
11. Normative drivers in mental incapacity assessment 
Evaluative considerations play an important part in shaping tests for mental 
incapacity. If a society strongly values individual freedom over personal well-
being, then a capacity test concerning personal matters within that society is 
likely to place only minimal constraints on the abilities necessary to make one’s 
own decisions. In this way, values play a crucial part in establishing mental 
incapacity standards.139 In the addiction and socio-legal literatures it has also been 
observed that perceptions of addiction, shaped by historical context and other 
factors including gender, have influenced how society responds.140 This role 
played by evaluative and other social factors, raises the possibility that some of 
these factors are shaping the interpretation of incapacity tests in an unrecognised 
and unjustified way. It is argued here that such inputs play a significant role in 
explaining the divergent findings in relation to the MCA’s application in the 
context of alcohol dependence and anorexia. 
 
                                                        
139 Camillia Kong has called for recognition of the role such factors play in best interests decisions 
within mental capacity law. Kong uses the hermeneutic concept of ‘prejudice’ to draw out the idea, 
where this refers not to a bias or negative prejudgement, but to the normative standpoint constituted 
by one’s historical context. Ibid 222. 
140 H. G. Levine, ‘The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of Habitual Drunkenness in 
America’ (1978) 39 Journal of Studies on Alcohol 143; R. Room, ‘The Cultural Framing of Addiction’ 
(2003) 6 Janus Head 221; D. Courtwright, ‘The NIDA Brain Disease Paradigm: History, Resistance and 
Spinoffs’ (2010) 5 BioSocieties 137; S. Fraser, ‘Junk: Overeating and obesity and the neuroscience of 
addiction’ (2013) 21 Addiction Research & Theory 496; S. Blumenthal 'The default legal person' (2007) 
54 UCLA Law Review 1135, 1229, 1262; A. Loughnan, Manifest madness: Mental incapacity in criminal 
law (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012), chapter 7.  
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Evidence of these inputs can be seen in Lord Donaldson’s judgment in Re W, a 
case concerning refusal of treatment for anorexia, when he draws a distinction 
between anorexia and other addictions: 
“Anorexia is an illness that is not the fault of the sufferer. In this it is no 
different from pneumonia or appendicitis…. It is an addictive illness 
although, unlike other addictions such as drug taking, the sufferer is not to 
be blamed for having allowed herself to become addicted.”141  
 
The question raised by this position concerns why we should blame people with a 
substance dependency for their condition, but not those with anorexia for theirs. 
One explanation, suggested by the comparison of anorexia with pneumonia and 
appendicitis, is about the degree of involvement one has in developing these 
conditions. In most cases, a person plays little to no causal role in the 
development of pneumonia or appendicitis and this is the reason that we don’t 
blame them for getting ill. The problem with this explanation when applied to 
anorexia, is that the development of anorexia seems to require much more 
involvement on the part of the person. Like those who are alcohol dependent, 
people with anorexia play a significant part in the development of their condition, 
when they pursue diet and exercise regimes that at some point get out of control. 
In this way, anorexia looks much more like substance dependency than 
pneumonia or appendicitis.  
 
                                                        
141 Re W (n 47) 73. A similar comparison was made by the prosecution expert witness in Stewart when 
they denied that alcohol dependence is a disease “in the typical sense like pneumonia”. (n 98) para 
13. 
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On the other hand, what strongly distinguishes substance dependency from 
anorexia is that anorexia develops in the pursuit of things that our society values. 
Thinness and exercise are considered virtuous, along with traits associated with 
anorexia such as perfectionism and resistance against bodily desires. It is 
proposed here that these positively evaluated factors, associated with anorexia 
but not alcohol dependency, lie behind the traditional pattern of blame expressed 
in Lord Donaldson’s judgment.  
 
A significant part of the concern here is that the motivation for the distinction 
drawn between substance dependency and anorexia in Re W is obscured. The 
explanation offered is that anorexia is like pneumonia and appendicitis, but the 
reasons for withholding blame in relation to these conditions are not the same. In 
the case of anorexia the reasons are primarily evaluative, while for pneumonia 
and appendicitis the reasons are primarily causal. The reference to pneumonia 
and appendicitis therefore conceals the motivating reasons for the assigning of 
blame in the case of substance dependency but not anorexia, making it seem that 
the distinction is much less value-based that it is.142  
 
                                                        
142 Fabian Freyenhagen and Tom O’Shea have argued that mental capacity assessments often involve 
evaluative assumptions, for example in the context of anorexia, about the value of thinness. Their 
point is that claims about ‘distorted thinking’ in this context make assumptions about the value of 
thinness relative to other things such as life. This is an important observation. However, the point 
being made in the present paper is that, whether or not the justification provided for a mental 
capacity decision involves assumptions of this kind, it may be shaped by unrecognised evaluative 
factors. F. Freyenhagen and T. O'Shea, 'Hidden substance: Mental disorder as a challenge to 
normatively neutral accounts of autonomy' (2013) 9 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 53. 
Gary Watson highlights the role for normative judgements of this kind in relation to blame. He 
proposes that if an addictive substance was considered extremely spiritually beneficial to society, 
blame for that dependency and associated acts would be more lenient compared with our attitudes 
to existing substance dependencies, which are viewed in a negative way. G. Watson, 'Excusing 
addiction' (1999) 18 Law and Philosophy 589. 
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It also may be the case that stereotypes associated with substance dependency 
and anorexia play a role in traditional patterns of blame. The mental picture of a 
person with anorexia is likely to be a well-mannered young woman; while the 
mental picture associated with alcohol dependency is likely to be a disheveled 
older man. The work of Daniel Kahneman and colleagues suggests that the 
stereotypes evoked may well influence judgements about blame, with gender 
potentially playing a part.143 
 
It is proposed here that such evaluative and other social inputs play a significant 
role in explaining the differences observed between the approach to assessing 
mental capacity in the context of alcohol dependency and anorexia. Any number 
of psychological accounts could be given to explain how this occurs, but one 
possibility is sketched here to illustrate the idea:  
 
Perhaps negative associations with alcohol dependency evoke feelings of anger 
and antipathy, and these connect to seeing the person as blameworthy. In 
assessments of mental capacity, the agency of the person—the target of the 
blame—is therefore likely to be more salient than the impact of the impairment 
on decisions, making a narrow interpretation of the MCA’s test seem appropriate 
to apply. On the other hand, perhaps the positive associations with anorexia 
evoke feelings of sadness and sympathy, which connect to seeing the person as 
an innocent victim. This seems likely to foreground the impact of the impairment 
                                                        
143 For example: D. Kahneman and S. Fredrick, 'Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment' in T. Gilovich, D. Griffin and D. Kahneman (eds) Heuristics and biases (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 49. 
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on decisions, making a wide interpretation of the MCA’s test seem appropriate to 
apply—enabling a finding of incapacity.144 
 
Whether this illustration captures the psychology of what happens in practice, 
what’s clear is that the evaluative factors identified in this section should not be 
influencing the interpretation of the MCA’s incapacity test. Knowledge about 
whether a brain injury resulted from a heroic act, dangerous driving or a freak 
accident, should not impact upon the assessment of the person’s ability to make 
their own treatment decisions. Likewise, there should be no difference in the way 
the MCA’s incapacity test is interpreted in the context of alcohol dependency and 
anorexia, merely based on value judgements associated with these conditions.145 
This raises questions about the assessment of mental capacity that go beyond 
these diagnostic contexts. As such, those responsible for assessing mental 
capacity should always be mindful that the MCA’s test can be interpreted in wide 
and narrow ways; and that evaluative judgements, which might not be part of 
conscious awareness at the time of assessment, may influence the interpretation 
that is applied. 
 
This paper began by outlining a debate about the virtues of cognitive tests verses 
                                                        
144 This illustration of how evaluative judgements associated with diagnoses might influence mental 
capacity assessments, should not be taken to deny that alcohol dependency is recognised as a 
medical disorder. Alcohol dependency has been included in the major diagnostic standards for many 
decades, and the diminished responsibility cases discussed above demonstrate this status being 
recognised in law.  
145 The fact that a dependency developed in pursuit of things that our society values (or not) does 
seem potentially relevant to the assigning of blame for resulting criminal acts. If someone developed 
a dependency while attempting to be a good citizen, then it seems reasonable to withhold blame to 
some degree, for negative consequences that follow. However, this should not be taken into account 
within a mental incapacity test, because this will obscure the justification for withholding blame. 
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those containing an explicit control element, and it concludes by returning to this 
issue. 
 
12. Cognitive verses volitional tests 
The above analysis demonstrates that mental impairments central to alcohol 
dependency can only be taken into account when incapacity tests are interpreted 
in a wide way that includes impaired control, not merely an absence of control. 
While this kind of observation has been made before in relation to cognitive 
incapacity tests, we have illustrated that the same point applies to tests that 
contain an explicit control element. The test within the law of diminished 
responsibility, with its control limb, was initially interpreted in a narrow way that 
made the defence unavailable on a basis of alcohol dependency. The solution 
adopted by the Court of Appeal was to hold that giving into a craving—behaviour 
that is willed—can, in law, be involuntary.  
 
However, this solution retains the terms involuntary drinking and irresistible 
craving to describe the incapacity that is necessary for the defence, and we 
wonder whether this language is likely to lead experts and juries back to narrow, 
binary thinking about control. A less stark way of describing the control element 
of the test might mitigate against this problem. The MCA’s ‘use and weigh’ limb 
seems to offer an advantage on this count. When control is the central issue, 
questions of the capacity to refuse treatment for anorexia are discussed using 
language referring to distorted, biased and overpowered thought. This makes it 
clearer that the question is not a binary matter about whether the person has any 
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control at all, but one about the difficulties the person faces in relation to control.  
 
This more subtle language, however, was not used in the judgments concerning 
alcohol dependency, with significance in the case of Ms X instead given to the idea 
that she was always making a choice to drink. When the impact of alcohol 
dependency on a person’s mental capacity was considered at all in the reported 
cases, it seems that a narrow interpretation of the MCA’s test was applied. We 
have argued that these findings are explained, at least in part, by certain kinds of 
evaluative and social judgements playing an unrecognised and inappropriate role 
in the interpretation of the incapacity test, when it is applied. The upshot is that 
one of Morse’s central criticisms of explicit control elements, equally applies to 
cognitive tests. For Morse, the concern is that control elements lead to:  
“misleading metaphorical thinking about mechanisms and expert 
testimony that is little more than moral judgment wrapped in the white 
coat of allegedly scientific or clinical understanding.”146  
 
If our analysis is borne out then this argument deployed against the inclusion of 
explicit control elements, in favour of cognitive tests, must be set aside. What 
appears to matter more than whether a test is cognitive or explicitly about 
control, is how the test is interpreted and applied. We propose that cognitive 
tests are just as vulnerable to interpretation that is inappropriately shaped by 
value judgements, as tests that include an explicit control element. These findings 
                                                        
146 Morse refers to tests that explicitly concern control as “the internal coercion or duress approach”. 
Morse 2000 (n 9) 38. 
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suggest that greater attention should be paid to way that value judgements can 
shape the interpretation of incapacity tests in practice, whether volitional or 
cognitive, and the concerning flexibility that can result. 
